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What is happening to the impact of financial deepening on economic growth?  
 
By Peter L. Rousseau and Paul Wachtel 
 
Although the finance-growth relationship is now firmly entrenched in the empirical 
literature, we show that it is not as strong in more recent data as it was in the original 
studies with data for the period from 1960 to 1989.  We consider two related 
explanations.  First, excessive financial deepening or too rapid growth of credit may have 
led to both inflation and weakened banking systems which in turn gave rise to growth-
inhibiting financial crises.  Second, excessive financial deepening may be a result of 
widespread financial liberalizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s in countries that 
lacked the legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit financial development successfully. 
We find that the increased incidence of financial crises since the 1990s is primarily 
responsible for the recent weakening of the finance-growth link, but find no direct 
evidence that liberalizations played an important supporting role.  
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1. Introduction 
Among the strongest elements of the modern economists’ canon is that financial 
sector development has a significant impact on economic growth.  A generation ago, 
economists like Goldsmith (1969)1 and McKinnon (1973) began to draw attention to the 
benefits of financial structure development and financial liberalization.  In 1991 (p. 12) 
McKinnon could write with confidence that:  
 “Now, however, there is widespread agreement that flows of saving and 
investment should be voluntary and significantly decentralized in an open capital 
market at close to equilibrium interest rates.”  
 
Since the 1990s, a burgeoning empirical literature has illustrated the importance of 
financial sector development for economic growth.   Despite the growing consensus, 
however, we find that the link between finance and growth in cross-country panel data 
has weakened considerably over time.  At the very time that financial sector liberalization 
spread around the world, the influence of financial sector development on economic 
growth has diminished.    
The seminal empirical work that established the growth-finance link is King and 
Levine (1993), which extended the cross-country framework introduced in Barro (1991) 
by adding financial variables such as the ratios of liquid liabilities or claims on the 
private sector to gross domestic product (GDP) to the standard growth regression.  They 
found a robust, positive, and statistically significant relationship between initial financial 
conditions and subsequent growth in real per capita incomes for a cross-section of about 
80 countries.  In the subsequent decade numerous empirical studies expanded upon this, 
using both cross-country and panel data sets for the post-1960 period.2   
In this paper we reexamine the core cross-country panel result and find that the 
impact of financial deepening on growth is not as strong with more recent data as it 
appeared in the original panel studies with data for the period from 1960 to 1989.  We 
                                                 
1 Goldsmith, for example, found a positive relationship between economic growth and 
financial development using a comparative approach with data for thirty-five countries 
over the period from 1860 to 1963. 
 
2 Levine (1997) surveys the literature through the mid-1990s, and Levine (2005) offers a 
comprehensive treatment of the many contributions that have followed.  See also Temple 
(1999).  
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consider two related explanations. First, we suggest that financial deepening has a 
positive effect on growth if not done to excess.  Rapid and excessive deepening, as 
manifested in a credit boom, can be problematic even in the most developed markets 
because it can both weaken the banking system and bring inflationary pressures. We test 
this hypothesis by looking at the finance-growth nexus among countries that have or have 
not experienced financial sector crises. We find that once crisis episodes are removed, the 
finance-growth relationship remains intact.  Its weakening over time thus seems to be a 
result of an increased incidence of crises in later years.  
Second, we consider whether this type of unproductive financial deepening resulted 
from the widespread liberalization of financial markets that occurred in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  This hypothesis is reminiscent of Robert Lucas’s famous critique of 
econometric policy evaluation advanced three decades ago. In Lucas (1975) the focus 
was on the now-obvious misuse of the Phillips curve in formulating policy prescriptions, 
but the basic lesson may apply in our application as well.  In particular, policies that have 
promoted and/or forced increases in financial depth over the past two decades, perhaps in 
response to the prevailing Washington consensus, may have altered the basic structural 
relationship between finance and growth.  This could occur if the observed benefits of 
financial deepening led many countries to liberalize before the associated legal and 
regulatory institutions were sufficiently well developed.  As a consequence, the impact of 
financial deepening on growth would become smaller.  The two explanations are related 
in that premature financial development can lead to financial crises that have real effects. 
Our evidence suggests that if recent liberalizations are responsible for the breakdown of 
the finance-growth link, however, it is occurring through this indirect route, as we do not 
find a direct link from financial liberalizations to cross-country differences in the effect 
of financial deepening on growth. 
Although the finance-growth nexus has become firmly entrenched, this is not the first 
study to question its importance.  Economists as disparate as Joan Robinson and Robert 
Lucas have expressed doubts about the link.3  In addition, some authors have been less 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Lucas (1988) suggests that the role of finance is “over-stressed” and Robinson (1952, p. 
80) asserts that “where enterprise leads, finance follows.” 
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than enthusiastic about the strength of the recently established empirical consensus and 
there are indications that the relationship varies and lacks robustness.4    
A few earlier papers have noted that the relationship between financial deepening 
and growth varies considerably (e.g. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis, 
Demetriades, and Luintel (2001)).   Further, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) show that the 
relationship varies with the inflation rate; financial deepening does not affect growth 
when the annual inflation rate is above a threshold between 13 and 25 percent.  Rioja and 
Valev (2004) show that the relationship varies with the level of economic development.  
Specifically, deepening has a larger impact on growth with a moderate level of financial 
sector development.  However, none of the earlier studies has provided an explanation for 
why the relationship has weakened over time. 
 A recent paper by Loayza and Ranciere (2006) addresses the dual role of financial 
deepening discussed above. They distinguish between the short run impact of credit 
expansions on growth and the long run positive of financial deepening on growth.   The 
short run effect is sometimes negative particularly during episodes of financial crisis.  
Our approach to this dual role of finance is somewhat different.  First, we will investigate 
how banking crises and liberalizations affect the impact of financial deepening on 
growth.  Second, we will relate these phenomena to the secular decline in the impact of 
financial deepening observed in the classical cross country panel regression framework.   
The next section describes the data and the by now standard approach to panel 
estimates of growth equations.  In the following section we present baseline estimates and 
show that the finance growth nexus has weakened over time.  In the next section we 
examine the hypotheses suggested above regarding financial crises and financial 
liberalizations.  Section 5 presents some additional evidence on the relationship between 
the finance effect and the levels of economic development and financial depth in a 
country. Our conclusions are in Section 6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4  The titles of some recent papers express the growing skepticism: e.g. “How much do 
we really know about growth and finance?” Wachtel (2003) and “Finance causes growth: 
Can we be so sure?” Manning (2003). 
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2. Data and methodology  
Our study includes cross sectional and panel data on financial and macroeconomic 
indicators for 84 countries over the period from 1960 to 2003.5  Data are from the 2005 
edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The selection of 
countries is based on data availability from this source.  To ensure comparability with 
King and Levine’s original study and others, we use three familiar measures of financial 
development, namely the ratios to GDP of liquid liabilities (M3), liquid liabilities less 
narrow money (M3 less M1), and credit allocated to the private sector.  M3 as a percent 
of GDP has become a standard measure of financial depth and an indicator of the overall 
size of financial intermediary activity in cross-country studies. M3 less M1 removes the 
pure transactions asset and the credit measure isolates intermediation to the private sector 
from credit allocated to government or state enterprises.6  
King and Levine’s (1993) version of the Barro growth regression, and the starting 
point for our analysis, has the form 
 
Yit =  α0 + αFit + βX it + uit,     (1) 
                                                 
5  The 84 countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.  
 
6  A number of studies, including Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000), expand the set of financial indicators to include measures of stock market size, 
trading, and turnover.  Most find a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between these measures and growth.  Bringing equity market variables into our analysis, 
however, would limit its scope to those countries and years for which stock market data 
are available, and would reduce the number of observations by more than half.  Since our 
aim is to examine the robustness of the most fundamental links between finance and 
long-run growth found in the early literature on the subject, we prefer a compact yet more 
complete treatment of the more traditional measures of financial sector development. 
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where Yit is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, Fit is a measure of financial sector 
development, and Xit is a set of baseline explanatory variables that have been shown 
empirically to be robust determinants of growth. The X variables include the log of initial 
real per capita GDP, which should capture the tendency for growth rates to converge 
across countries and over time, and the log of the initial secondary school enrollment rate, 
which should reflect the extent of investment in human capital.  We also run regressions 
that include the ratio of trade (i.e., imports plus exports) to GDP and the ratio of 
government final consumption to GDP as additional explanatory variables.  
We estimate equation (1) with a panel of 5-year averages from 1960 to 2003.7   To 
reduce any simultaneity bias that would result from the influence of economic growth on 
the development of the financial sector, we follow the literature and use instrumental 
variables (two-stage least squares).   Specifically, we attempt to extract the predetermined 
component of the financial variable by using its initial value (in each 5-year average) 
along with the initial values of government expenditure and trade as percentages of GDP 
as instruments in each regression equation.  
 
3. The decline in the finance-growth relationship 
Table 1 contains results from the baseline growth equations for each of the three 
measures of financial depth for the full data period, 1960-2003.  The results are largely 
consistent with the consensus in the literature. The coefficients on the financial variables 
are positive and significant, although only at the 10 percent level in the specification with 
the ratio of private credit to GDP.  However, the coefficients are smaller than those 
reported in King and Levine (1993), which suggests that there might be some 
heterogeneity in the sample over time that needs to be explored.  The control variables - 
government expenditure and trade as percentages of GDP - are significant and have the 
expected signs, but their presence or absence does not have much effect on the finance 
coefficients.  There are some differences in other coefficients between the two 
                                                 
7 There is thus a maximum of 9 panel observations for each country. The last panel 
observation includes data averaged over only four years. 
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specifications.  Only in the simpler specification is the coefficient on the log of initial real 
GDP negative (although not statistically significant), which would be consistent with the 
notion of beta convergence.  The positive and significant coefficients on the log of the 
initial secondary school enrollment rate suggest that human capital investment matters for 
growth.   
The differences in these results from earlier published work with the same data 
definitions call for explanation. Our results extend the data sets used in earlier work to 
2003 while the data in King and Levine’s paper ends in 1989.8  In Table 2 we present 
estimates of baseline equations for two time periods.  The first period, 1960-89, coincides 
with the data used by King and Levine and others that established the consensus results 
that have become so important.  The second period, which runs from 1990 to 2003, is 
shorter but each panel equation still includes about 200 observations.   
The differences between the two time periods are dramatic.  The effect of financial 
depth on growth, which is always significant in the first 30-year period, all but disappears 
in the next 15. Whereas all of the finance coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level 
in the early time period, only one is significant at the 10 percent level in the more recent 
data.  The coefficients on the M3 ratio fall by two-thirds and the others by more.  
Interestingly, the standard errors of the estimates are about the same in both periods.  
That is, the precision of the estimates is unchanged; the effects are simply smaller and 
therefore not significantly different from zero.  The other coefficients in the growth 
equations are relatively stable across time periods.  At the same time, a Chow test for the 
equality of all the coefficients across time periods in Table 2 rejects the hypothesis of 
stability at the 1 percent level. 
To examine further the differences over time in the effect of financial depth on 
growth, we estimated the baseline equation separately with the cross section of data from 
each 5-year period.  That is, from 1960 to 2003 there are nine cross sections.  Estimates 
from instrumental variables regressions with each of the three measures of financial depth 
                                                 
8  In addition, later editions of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators provide 
some estimates for observations in earlier years that were previously missing. 
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are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5.9   
The coefficient on M3 as a percent of GDP is positive and significant for four 
successive time periods running from 1965 to 1984 but insignificant in the earlier and 
subsequent periods (Table 3).  The same is true for the coefficients on M3 less M1 (Table 
4) with the exception of one time period in the 1970s where the coefficient drops. In 
contrast, the coefficient on the private credit ratio is only significantly different from zero 
in one time period (Table 5).  But the coefficient on private sector credit is clearly 
positive (averaging .025) from the late 1960s to the early 1990s and then falls to zero or 
below.  The coefficient on the M3 ratio falls to zero from 1985 on and the coefficient on 
M3 less M1 falls to zero from 1990 on.  Once again, Chow tests for the regressions in 
each table reject the hypothesis of coefficient stability across the 9 time periods at the 1 
percent level.  
These tables provide a clear story.  The finance effect on growth is a disappearing 
phenomenon. In the next section we examine two hypotheses that might explain the 
result.   
 
4.  Understanding the changes in the finance growth relationship 
In this section we relate the finance growth relationship to the two hypotheses stated 
in the introduction (section 1).  We relate the finance effect to, first, the incidence of 
financial crises and, second, to country efforts at financial liberalization.  
The disappearance of the finance effect on growth over time may be related to the 
incidence of financial crises since such episodes are often associated with too-rapid 
financial deepening.  There is a thin line between financial deepening that comes from 
the expansion of financial intermediary activity and financial deepening that is the 
consequence of a credit boom.   In the first instance increased intermediation is likely to 
be growth enhancing, while in the second instance credit standards deteriorate, 
nonperforming loans proliferate and a banking crisis ensues.  The effect of financial 
deepening on growth may have disappeared since the 1990s because many recent 
experiences with deepening have fallen into the second category.   
                                                 
9 The tables show the specification that includes the government expenditure and trade 
variables.  The results without these variables are indistinguishable.  
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We investigate this hypothesis by isolating episodes of financial crisis and examining 
the impact of financial deepening on growth in non-crisis episodes.  We use the 
identification and dating prepared by Capri and Klingebiel (2003) for systematic systemic 
banking and financial crises around the world.  Of the 84 countries in our sample, 45 
have experienced at least one major crisis. We characterize a 5-year country observation 
as a crisis period if the country was in crisis at any time during the period. 
Instrumental variable estimates of the baseline growth equations that allow the 
finance coefficient to vary when there is either a major or minor financial crisis are 
shown in Table 6. Each equation shows the finance variable for all observations and then 
the finance variable interacted with dummies for crisis episodes.  The size of the 
coefficient on the finance variable indicates the impact of finance on growth in non-crisis 
observations.  These effects are all positive and significant and larger than the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 1, which does not account for crisis episodes.  The 
interaction with the major crisis dummy indicates the difference in the finance effect 
when a country is in crisis.  In every case, the finance effect is significantly smaller at the 
5 percent level when there is a financial crisis. In fact, the impact of financial deepening 
in these crisis periods is often near zero. The minor crisis episodes also have a negative 
impact on the finance coefficients but the change is usually small and insignificant. 
 Since excessive credit creation can lead to instability and crisis, and financial 
liberalization is usually associated with the rapid development of financial institutions, 
capital flows, and increases in liquid liabilities, the disappearance of the finance effect on 
growth over time could represent an application of the Lucas critique.  The Washington 
consensus about the benefits of financial liberalization emerged in the 1980s.  Policy 
makers busily touted the benefits of liberalization of financial markets and the growth of 
financial institutions.  Governments around the world took heed of the message and there 
was rapid growth in average levels of financial depth.  However, in many of these 
countries credit and deposit growth took place without the requisite development of 
lending expertise, mechanisms for monitoring, and supervisory and regulatory skills.  So 
the relationships observed in the early data disappeared as efforts to liberalize financial 
markets became widespread.  One interpretation could therefore be that changing views 
about liberalization led to policy initiatives that did not replicate the earlier successes. 
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In order to explore the impact of liberalizations we use the dating of equity market 
liberalizations in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005).  They use a variety of data 
sources to date an important element of financial sector liberalization, the liberalization 
of access by foreigners to the domestic equity market.  This classification scheme can be 
applied to virtually all of the countries in our sample, and it turns out that a large number 
of countries experienced liberalization, although most of the liberalization occurred 
within a rather short period of time in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.   Thus, we can 
associate our 5-year average growth observations with the liberalization status of the 
country.  We separate our observations into four groups indicating whether a country was 
always liberalized, never liberalized, the pre-liberalization periods of countries that 
liberalized, and the corresponding post liberalization observations.  
Instrumental variable estimates of the base line growth equations that allow the 
finance coefficient to vary with the country’s liberalization status are shown in Table 7. 
Each equation shows the finance variable for all observations and then the finance 
variable interacted with dummies for three of the liberalization groups (the always 
liberalized group is omitted).  Thus, the coefficients on the interaction variables are 
differences in the finance effect from the effect for always-liberalized countries.  None of 
the interaction coefficients is significantly different from zero and they are all quite small.  
There is some indication that the finance effect is larger in never liberalized countries and 
smaller in countries prior to liberalization. 
This result does not indicate that the finance effect on growth has been altered by 
equity market liberalizations, and thus does not offer direct support for the hypothesized 
Lucas type effect.  Of course, it might be difficult to identify the effect of liberalizations 
on the coefficient on financial deepening because the liberalization itself often promotes 
growth. Indeed, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad find that that equity market liberalizations 
increase growth rates by a full percentage point.  It might also be hard to distinguish this 
change from the effect of time (since all the post liberalization observations are later on) 
although time period fixed effects are included in all the equations. 10   
                                                 
10  For example, an additional explanation might be that there are distinct characteristics 
of the two decades, the 70s and 80s, that made the financial ratios seem to cause growth 
at that time but not otherwise.  Those decades are dominated by the oil shocks and 
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 The conclusion to be drawn from Tables 6 and 7 is clear.  The decline in the finance 
coefficients over time is not an inexplicable time effect or the direct result of a Lucas 
critique eroding the value of financial deepening.  The coefficients are smaller in recent 
years because of the increased incidence of financial and banking crises.  Financial 
deepening promotes growth as long as it is not excessive.  Once excessive growth of 
money and credit leads to a crisis in the banking system, the benefits of financial 
deepening disappear until the crisis is cleaned up.   
 
5. Additional evidence 
In this section we examine some additional sample composition effects that might 
affect the relationship between finance and growth.  Specifically, we look at the variation 
of the finance effect with the level of initial financial depth in a country and with the 
level of per capita income in a country. In the first instance, we look to see whether 
financial deepening has a payoff in countries with undeveloped financial sectors as well 
as those with already developed financial sectors.  In the second instance, we look to see 
whether financial deepening pays off in low income countries as well as in high income 
countries.   
We explore these issues with a rolling regression techniques first applied to study of 
the finance-growth nexus by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002).   In that paper we showed 
that the cross-sectional relationship between finance and growth vanished in high 
inflation environments.   
To systematically examine the effects of sample composition, we present results from 
two rolling IV regressions with that use the simple baseline equation and the M3 ratio as 
the finance variable.11   Figure 1 shows the evolution of the finance coefficient for 20-
country rolling windows, with each panel using an alternative metric along the horizontal 
axis. In each panel the solid line gives the estimated coefficients and 5 percent confidence 
intervals are given by the dotted lines.  
                                                                                                                                                 
periods of high inflation in many countries. It could well be that greater financial depth is 
associated with growth because these countries are better able to withstand the large 
nominal shocks that characterize the period.  This would in fact be a benefit of deeper 
financial institutions but would not imply that increases in financial depth cause growth. 
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In panel (a) we order the countries by the average level of financial depth (after 
adjusting for global time effects) and roll them in as the ratio of M3 to GDP increases.  
The initial regression includes the 20 countries with the lowest levels of financial depth 
and rolls in additional countries and rolls out the initial countries one by one so that each 
coefficient is from an estimate with a constant 20-country window. Thus, the coefficients 
from the 20-country windows in panel (a) reflect the effects of finance on growth among 
countries with relatively similar financial sectors.   
The results are striking; financial deepening matters when the M3 to GDP ratio is 
around the middle of the observed range (about 50%).  Among the financially less 
developed countries the coefficient is sometimes negative, is quite variable, and is 
imprecisely measured.  Among the financially most developed countries the coefficient is 
about zero; although financial depth differs a lot among these countries it has no 
relationship to growth.   
In panel (b), we turn to the relationship between the finance effect on growth and the 
level of per capital income.  It shows results from rolling regressions with a 20-country 
window where countries are rolled in by increasing average per capita income (in 1995 
U.S. dollars).12  For very low income countries (income below $3,000), the effect of 
financial deepening is positive but not significant.  The effect is imprecisely estimated 
because in many of these countries increased financial depth might be due to directed 
finance and poor lending standards.  However, in the middle income range (from $3,000 
to $12,000), there seems to be clear evidence of a finance growth relationship.  At these 
income levels, groups of countries that are relatively homogeneous by income have 
different growth experiences that are related to financial depth.  The relationship 
disappears among higher income countries with the coefficients around zero.  These 
results indicate that the finance growth nexus appears to be stronger in certain economic 
environments.  Countries with moderately developed financial sectors or countries with 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 The overall estimates for the entire sample are given in the first column of Table 1.  
12 We establish an income ordering of countries by regressing the initial values of per 
capita income in each 5-year period for all of the countries in our sample on a constant  
and dummy variables for the time periods. We then use the averages of the adjusted 
series for each country (i.e., the residuals with the constant term added back in). 
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middle levels of per capita income have a stronger and significant impact of financial 
deepening on economic growth.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the robustness of some now-classic findings on the cross-
country relationship between financial development and economic growth. The finance-
growth relationship that was estimated with data from the 1960s to the 1980s simply 
disappears in the past fifteen years.  One might conclude that the underlying relationship 
that is so widely used is simply unstable.  Instead, we investigate some simple and related 
hypotheses that might explain the time effects.   
First, we test whether the incidence of domestic banking and financial crises affects 
the impact of deepening.  Here the evidence is very strong.  Financial deepening has a 
strong impact on growth throughout the sample period as long as a country can avoid a 
financial crisis.  In crisis episodes, which are more often than not due to excessive 
deepening, the benefits of financial deepening, not surprisingly, disappear.  
Second, we test to see whether an affect analogous to the Lucas critique is at work. In 
the context of our problem, it would imply that financial deepening causes growth as long 
as the relationship is not exploited.  That is, policy makers who try to take advantage of 
the benefits of financial deepening might do so without adequate precautions in place.  
We use international equity market opening as an indicator of liberalization and find that 
the effect of financial deepening does not weaken when liberalizations occur.  Our 
evidence does not support a direct Lucas-type argument, though it does not preclude that 
the possibility that too-rapid liberalization contributes to a higher incidence of growth-
inhibiting financial crises. 
All of this does not detract from the basic point that at one time countries with higher 
levels of financial development tended to have higher growth rates than those with lower 
levels of financial development. The question of how these countries acquired large 
financial sectors and how they may have served as engines of growth, however, remains 
imperfectly understood. Did finance emerge due to the presence of deeper institutional 
fundamentals that had a direct impact on growth as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) suggest? Or is Joan Robinson (1952) correct that growth is the prime mover 
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behind financial development?  Our study, while by no means arguing that financial 
factors is no longer important for economic development, serves simply as a reminder 
that the link between finance and growth is more complex than the simple relationships 
suggest.  It would appear that deepening needs to be accompanied by appropriate policies 
for financial sector reform and regulation.  Thus, the systematic study of the financial 
development experiences of individual countries becomes all the more critical as the next 
step in furthering our understanding of the nexus.           
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Table 1
Baseline instrumental variables growth regressions, 1960-2003 
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
-0.143
(0.102)
0.005
(0.107)
-0.168
(0.104)
-0.034
(0.109)
-0.082
(0.116)
0.024
(0.118)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
0.750** 
(0.178)
0.681** 
(0.177)
0.757** 
(0.178)
0.705** 
(0.177)
0.878** 
(0.176)
0.812** 
(0.174)
 Liquid liabilities (M3)
 (% of  GDP)
0.017** 
(0.004)
0.017** 
(0.004)
 M3 less M1 
 (% of GDP)
0.026** 
(0.005)
0.023** 
(0.006)
 Private sector credit
 (% of GDP)
0.006 
(0.004)
0.007* 
(0.004)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.084** 
(0.022)
-0.083** 
(0.023)
-0.077** 
(0.021)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
0.009** 
(0.004)
0.009** 
(0.004)
0.012** 
(0.003)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.218
(625)
.251
(620)
.235
(605)
.262
(601)
.202
(639)
.241
(633)
The table reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions using 5-year
averages of the data with standard errors  in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical
significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  Instruments include
initial values of government expenditure, international trade, and the respective financial
variable as a percentage of GDP, with initial values taken as the first observation of each
5-year period. The regressions also include a dummy variable for each  time period.  
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Table 2
Instrumental variables growth regressions for two subperiods
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
1960-1989 1990-2003
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
-0.054
(0.123)
-0.037
(0.126)
-0.137
(0.132)
-0.064
(0.134)
-0.118
(0.146)
-0.056
(0.146)
-0.402** 
(0.194)
-0.101
(.217)
-0.373** 
(0.188)
-0.101
(.211)
-0.261** 
(0.207)
-0.077
(.217)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
0.528** 
(0.196)
0.508** 
(0.193)
0.616** 
(0.196)
0.601** 
(0.104)
0.716** 
(0.194)
0.676** 
(0.191)
1.505** 
(0.454)
1.236** 
(0.458)
1.444** 
(0.463)
1.238** 
(0.465)
1.504** 
(0.432)
1.320** 
(0.430)
 Liquid liabilities (M3)
 (% of  GDP)
0.026** 
(0.006)
0.028** 
(0.006)
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.003
(0.007)
  
 M3 less M1 
 (% of GDP)
0.033** 
(0.007)
0.034** 
(0.007)
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.007
(0.009)
 Private sector credit
 (% of GDP)
0.021** 
(0.007)
0.024** 
(0.007)
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.007
(0.006)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.086** 
(0.028)
-0.074** 
(0.029)
-0.075** 
(0.027)
 -0.084** 
(0.038)
 -0.100** 
(0.041)
 -0.080** 
(0.036)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
0.005 
(0.005)
0.006 
(0.005)
0.012** 
(0.005)
0.015** 
(0.005)
0.014** 
(0.005)
0.013** 
(0.004)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.272
(412)
.298
(412)
.272
(410)
.292
(410)
.257
(412)
.289
(412)
.096
(213)
.148
(208)
.121
(195)
.168
(191)
.099
(227)
.158
(221)
The table  reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with standard errors  in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the
10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  Instruments include initial values of government expenditure, international trade, and the respective financial
variable, with initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period. The regressions also include dummy variables for the 5-year time periods.
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Table 3
Instrumental variables growth regressions with M3 (% of GDP), 5-year cross sections 1960-2003 
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
0.470
(0.360)
-0.285
(0.262)
-0.085
(0.303)
-0.016
(0.359)
-0.131
(0.336)
0.330
(0.286)
-0.028
(0.395)
-0.024
(.282)
-0.253
(.465)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
0.348
(0.448)
0.783** 
(0.330)
0.629
(0.433)
-0.162
(0.562)
0.720
(0.610)
0.684
(0.603)
1.911** 
(0.797)
0.950
(0.621)
-0.313
(1.046)
 Liquid liabilities (M3)
 (% of  GDP)
-0.003
(0.019)
0.044** 
(0.013)
0.033** 
(0.013)
0.040** 
(0.016)
0.035** 
(0.015)
0.015
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.016
(0.014)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.033
(0.113)
0.014 
(0.066)
-0.085
(0.067)
-0.128* 
(0.072)
-0.022
(0.062)
-0.186** 
(0.059)
-0.177** 
(0.072)
-0.019
(0.051)
-0.037
(0.073)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
-0.006
(0.014)
-0.006 
(0.011)
0.003
(0.012)
0.019
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.012)
0.020* 
(0.010)
0.025**
(0.010)
0.005
(0.007)
0.012
(0.011)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.133
(52)
.371
(66)
.218
(67)
.101
(74)
.115
(78)
.249
(75)
.268
(81)
.098
(79)
.103
(48)
The table  reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with standard errors  in parentheses. .  * and **
denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. Instruments include initial values of the
full set of regressors, with initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period
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Table 4
Instrumental variables growth regressions with M3 less M1 (% of GDP), 5-year cross sections 1960-2003
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
0.464
(0.392)
-0.350
(0.256)
-0.265
(0.342)
0.136
(0.382)
-0.247
(0.355)
0.083
(0.284)
-0.130
(0.408)
0.062
(.306)
-0.292
(.376)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
0.514
(0.482)
0.725** 
(0.318)
0.528
(0.456)
0.056
(0.580)
0.819
(0.606)
0.718
(0.564)
1.833** 
(0.821)
0.956
(0.711)
0.217
(0.837)
 M3 less M1
 (% of  GDP)
0.003
(0.026)
0.066** 
(0.014)
0.044** 
(0.020)
0.012 
(0.019
0.039** 
(0.018)
0.035** 
(0.013)
0.012
(0.014)
-0.007
(0.015)
0.001
(0.016)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.031
(0.123)
0.068 
(0.065)
-0.060
(0.069)
0.129* 
(0.078)
-0.011
(0.065)
-0.172** 
(0.057)
-0.174** 
(0.077)
-0.035
(0.057)
-0.033
(0.069)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.011 
(0.011)
0.006
(0.012)
0.027** 
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.013)
0.015 
(0.010)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.009 
(0.008)
0.013
(0.009)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.181
(55)
.441
(64)
.158
(68)
.134
(73)
.119
(77)
.297
(73)
.279
(76)
.109
(72)
.099
(43)
The table  reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with standard errors  in parentheses. * and ** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  Instruments include initial values of the full set of
regressors, with initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period. 
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Table 5
Instrumental variables growth regressions with private sector credit (% of GDP), 5-year cross sections 1960-2003
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
0.561
(0.388)
-0.266
(0.333)
-0.107
(0.354)
0.049
(0.409)
-0.109
(0.371)
-0.128
(0.334)
-0.054
(0.418)
0.173
(.286)
-0.429
(.443)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
0.325
(0.428)
0.899** 
(0.357)
0.713
(0.440)
0.078
(0.566)
0.940
(0.603)
0.838
(0.565)
2.018** 
(0.761)
0.903
(0.611)
0.041
(0.924)
 Private sector credit
 (% of  GDP)
0.004
(0.022)
0.029 
(0.019)
0.026 
(0.018)
0.020 
(0.020)
0.014 
(0.017)
0.037** 
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.007)
0.014
(0.010)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.033
(0.098)
0.042 
(0.070)
-0.059
(0.068)
-0.121 
(0.074)
-0.018
(0.062)
-0.173** 
(0.057)
-0.163** 
(0.070)
-0.039
(0.051)
-0.025
(0.064)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
-0.009
(0.012)
0.007 
(0.012)
0.010
(0.012)
0.029** 
(0.013)
0.001
(0.012)
0.025** 
(0.010)
0.021**
(0.008)
0.010* 
(0.006)
0.011
(0.007)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.217
(52)
.266
(66)
.189
(66)
.143
(74)
.099
(79)
.309
(75)
.251
(82)
.151
(83)
.107
(56)
The table  reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with standard errors  in parentheses.  * and ** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. Instruments include initial values of the full set of
regressors, with initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period.
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Table 6
Instrumental variables growth regressions by crisis status, 1960-2003 
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 Financial Variable: M3 (% GDP)  M3-M1 (% GDP)  Credit (% GDP)
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
-0.150
(0.102)
-0.005
(0.106)
-0.183*
(0.104)
-0.057
(0.109)
-0.132
(0.117)
-0.028
(0.119)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
 0.722** 
(0.177)
 0.654** 
(0.176)
 0.739** 
(0.177)
 0.695** 
(0.176)
 0.876** 
(0.175)
 0.814** 
(0.173)
 Finance  0.021**
(0.004)
  0.022**
(0.005)
 0.032** 
(0.006)
 0.030** 
(0.006)
 0.012** 
(0.005)
  0.013**  
(0.005)
 Finance x major 
 financial crisis
-0.016** 
(0.005)
 -0.017**
(0.005)
 -0.024** 
(0.008)
 -0.024**
(0.008)
 -0.014**
(0.005)
 -0.015**
(0.005)
 Finance x minor
 financial crisis
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.013 
(0.010)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.010*
(0.006) 
-0.007
(0.006)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.087**
(0.022)
-0.082**
(0.023)
   -0.078**   
   (0.021)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
 0.008** 
(0.004)
 0.008** 
(0.004)
0.011** 
   (0.003)
 R2
 (No. observations)
.230
(625)
.262
(620)
.247
(606)
.272
(602)
.214
(639)
.252
(633)
The table reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions using 5-year averages of the
data with standard errors  in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent
and 5 percent levels respectively.  Instruments include initial values of government expenditure,
international trade, and the respective interacted financial variables as percentages of GDP, with
initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period. The regressions also include a
dummy variable for each time period. 
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Table 7
Instrumental variables growth regressions by liberalization status, 1960-2003 
Dependent variable: % Growth of per capita real GDP
 Financial Variable: M3 (% GDP)  M3-M1 (% GDP)  Credit (% GDP)
 Log of initial real per 
 capita GDP (1995 US$)
-0.138
(0.104)
0.012
(0.108)
-0.161
(0.110)
-0.026
(0.111)
-0.087
(0.117)
0.024
(0.120)
 Log of secondary school
 enrollment rate
 0.740** 
(0.181)
 0.669** 
(0.178)
 0.755** 
(0.180)
 0.709** 
(0.178)
 0.873** 
(0.176)
 0.811** 
(0.174)
 Finance  0.017**
(0.004)
 0.016**
(0.005)
 0.025** 
(0.006)
 0.022** 
(0.006)
 0.007*  
(0.004)
 0.007*  
(0.004)
 Finance x 
 never liberalized
0.002 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.007)
0.007 
(0.007)
-0.001 
(0.004)
0.001 
(0.004)
 Finance x 
 pre-liberalization
-0.001 
(0.006)
-0.002 
(0.006)
-0.005 
(0.009)
-0.007 
(0.009)
-0.005 
(0.006)
-0.006 
(0.006)
 Finance x 
 post liberalization
0.002 
(0.006)
0.001 
(0.006)
0.003 
(0.009)
0.000 
(0.009)
0.007 
(0.006)
0.003 
(0.007)
 Government expenditure
 (% of GDP)
-0.087**
(0.022)
-0.088**
(0.023)
-0.076**
(0.022)
 Trade (% of GDP)
 
0.009** 
(0.004)
0.010** 
(0.004)
0.011** 
(0.003)
 Exclude liberalization
 variables (p-value) 0.934 0.344 0.797 0.536 0.437 0.692
 R2
 (No. observations)
.219
(625)
.253
(620)
.243
(606)
.265
(602)
.205
(639)
.242
(633)
The table reports coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions using 5-year averages
of the data with standard errors  in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the
10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  Instruments include initial values of government
expenditure, international trade, and the respective interacted financial variables as
percentages of GDP, with initial values taken as the first observation of each 5-year period.
The regressions also include a dummy variable for each time period. 
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                                   (a) 20-country rolling window ordered by increasing M3 (% of GDP)   
                    (b) 20-country rolling window order by increasing per capita income (thousands of 1995 U.S.$)   
Fig. 1. Evolution of coefficients on M3 (% GDP) in rolling window cross country regressions 1960-2003.
